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PROCEDURE
Power of a Trial Judge to Order a Remittitur After a
Jury Verdict For Personal Injuries
The case of Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co. 1 recently came
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia on the question
of a trial judge's power to order a remittitur after a jury verdict
in a personal injury case. The trial judge ordered a remittitur
of $10,000 after a jury verdict of $15,000 for the plaintiff's
injuries. The reduced verdict of $5,000 was accepted by the
plaintiff under protest, in accordance with the provisions of
§ 8-350, Code of Virginia, 1950, which allows an appeal when
a verdict is reduced by the court and accepted under protest.
On appeal it was urged by the plaintiff that in personal
injury cases the amount of the award is left largely to the
discretion of the jury, and their verdict is not usually disturbed.
But the Supreme Court adopted the decision of the trial court,
holding that the remittitur was proper, since the jury verdict
was excessive and shocked the conscience of the court, and
indicated that the jury misconstrued the facts.
Many cases in Virginia, as well as in other jurisdictions,
have been appealed to ascertain the authority of a trial judge to
disturb a jury verdict. In most, if not all, of these cases the
statement that there is "no weight or measure for determining
the proper compensation to be allowed for injuries caused by
a wrong" 2 has appeared. The most frequently quoted and
certainly the most frequently used, measure was stated by
Lacy, J., in Ward v. White, 3 when, in referring to the parties
involved in a damage suit, he said, "They [the parties] admit
to no other test than the intelligence of the jury governed by a
4
sense of justice."
It goes without saying that an intelligent jury verdict is
the most practical and fair method for determining the extent
1 203

Va. 142, 122 S.E.2d 872 (1961).

2 Ward v. White, 86 Va. 200, 212, 9 S.E. 1021, 1024 (1889); Dinwiddie v.

Hamilton, 201 Va. 348, 352, 111 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1959).
3 Ward v. White, supra note 2.

4 Ibid.
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of one's injuries and ascertaining what award should be given,
but at the same time there must also be a measure for deciding
when a jury verdict is intelligent. A mere difference of opinion
between the jury and the trial judge as to the adequacy of the
award will not justify any interference by the trial judge, but
when the award is dearly out of proportion to the injury suffered it is the duty of the court to add to the verdict or to put
the plaintiff on terms. 5 When the verdict is dearly out of proportion it may indicate "that the jury has been influenced by
passion or prejudice, or in some way has misconstrued or misinterpreted the facts or the law." 6 This explanation may seem
gratifying in that it appears to balance the scales of authority
between judge and jury when a question arises as to the extent
of award for the plaintiff's injuries, but again, it is necessary to
provide a measure for determining when a verdict is out of
proportion. The "shocked conscience" test is certainly the
one most frequently referred to and appears to complete this
circular explanation of tests and measures. Where the verdict
is so excessive or so inadequate as to shock the conscience of
the court it may warrant the conclusion "that the jury were
actuated by bias or prejudice, or that the evidence of the extent of the injuries was disregarded." 7
However, the results might be interesting if the question
were posed, "what measure or test shall be used in determining
when the conscience of the court is shocked?" Clearly no such
test is available; thus, the circular explanation of tests must be
amended to the extent that an award should be subject not
only "to the intelligence of the jury", 8 but also to the intelligence and experience of the trial judge which is frequently
more fully developed than that of the jury.
In Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co. it was made manifest
that the plaintiff suffered no serious or permanent injury; that
he lost only $45.00 in wages while away from his job; that he
spent only $59.00 for medical treatment; yet the jury returned
5 C. D. Kinney Co. v. Solomon, 158 Va. 25, 163 S.E. 97 (1932); Dinwiddie

v. Hamilton, supra note 2.
6 C. D. Kinney Co. v. Solomon, supra note 5.

7Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, supra note 2.
8 Ward v. White, supra note 2.
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a $15,000 verdict in his favor.9 Granted, it is difficult to
ascertain the extent of pain and suffering, but for relatively
slight injuries such a verdict clearly seems out of proportion.
Yet in Virginia, as well as in many other jurisdictions, a
comparatively easy means of appellate review10 is available
to litigants, upon proper motion, to question the trial judge's
discretion if he changes the verdict.
Section 8-224, Code of Virginia, 1950, gives the trial judge
power to grant a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the
evidence, and § 8-350 allows for a remittitur on the same
grounds. However, if the plaintiff accepts the reduced verdict
under protest, he is entitled to review before the Supreme
Court. Section 8-224 appears to satisfy the litigant's rights
while at the same time it allows the trial judge to exercise his
discretion which usually goes undisturbed. However, § 8-350
does not provide the same equality. The trial judge may
alter a jury verdict, but without extensive effort by the plaintiff
his decision is immediately subject to review. This arrangement hardly seems satisfactory, for with such a provision not
only is the trial judge's discretion suspect but the entire theory
behind giving the trial judge the power to order a remittitur
seems useless. Unless the entire case is pleaded before the
Supreme Court, who besides the trial judge is better able to
ascertain whether or not the verdict is contrary to the evidence? Certainly not the jury.
Consequently, when a reduced verdict is accepted under
protest and it is presented to the Supreme Court for review,
the judges are faced with a great dilemma. They have only
two alternatives from which to choose; either allow the remittitur to stand or reinstate the jury verdict. The opinions of
the judges cannot be substituted for that of the jury in deciding the adequacy of a verdict for they were not present at
the trial. Since the judges are confronted with little more than
the verdict itself, it is apparent that the judgment of the jury
is substantially binding on them, and as extrinsic evidence is
not available to them the verdict may or may not show upon
9 Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra note 1.
10 VA. CODE ANN., § 8-350 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
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its face indicia of bias or prejudice or mistakes of fact or law. 1
It is evident that the burden placed upon the Supreme Court
to determine whether a remittitur should stand or a jury
verdict should be reinstated is too great. Therefore, it should
not be incumbent upon the Supreme Court to make the choice
between remittitur and jury verdict when all of the facts are
not at hand, but a third alternative should be available to the
judges, viz., being able to order a new trial as to the damages.
S. G. B.,Jr.
11 Abronovitch v. Ayres, 169 Va. 308, 193 S.E. 524 (1937).

